Diplomatic Surge in Iraq, too little too late (US Military Controls Diplomacy In Iraq)

By: marshall adame
Published On: 5/31/2007 9:33:42 PM

Go to just about any significant meeting between Iraqi Government and US government officials in Iraq and you will quickly understand who is running the Diplomatic efforts in Iraq. The US Military.
Ask any Iraqi government official in Baghdad, or in any of the 18 provinces, who they are primarily counseling and meeting with regarding civil development and governance capacity building and they will, in almost all cases, reply "the US Army".

US Diplomats have, in effect, relinquished their Diplomatic "front seat" in Iraq to the US Military.
 
The Military, although well intentioned, comes to the table with little or no idea of what is "diplomatically" required of those engaged in efforts geared to joint solutions, resolutions, plans and cooperative efforts which benefit all parties in substantive and acceptable operational environments. Diplomacy, in dealing with the Iraqis, is far removed from the Army mindset, as it should be.

In the mind of an Army officer, the needs of the Army are paramount to any objective or requirement. Other, non-Army, priorities, requirements, objectives or desires come a very distant second in any action or negotiation. Diplomacy is not the forte of the US Military. Fighting wars is. Diplomacy is far removed from the dynamics and tactics of fighting a ground war. There is however a requirement for the execution of Diplomatic efforts and programs and administration in a War. That is why we have the US Department of State.

With the US Military in Iraq, diplomacy ends at the exact spot where the Army interest begins. In Iraq this is evident in every single case where the Army is in the lead in dealing with the Iraqis and the Iraqi government. If the US Military "diplomatic" interaction with Iraqi government entities were limited or conducted sparingly, this would not be a major problem, but in Iraq the US Military dominates every single diplomatic and governmental interaction between the two countries and their interest.

The US Ambassador in Iraq, has effectively relinquished his duties and responsibilities to the US Department of Defense. The consequences of which are very evident in Iraq today. As for his part, the US Ambassador, apparently for lack of authority from the President, funding from the DoS, or agreement from the Secretary of Defense, has little to no decision making authority relative to any major US initiatives in Iraq, militarily or Diplomatic. He does make all of the press and photo opportunities. Former Ambassador to Iraq , Zalmay Khalilzad  and the newly assigned Ambassador Ryan Crocker are very engaging and interesting speakers, but their leadership and authority in Iraq has been hardly seen and little heard.

A US Ambassador, in the country where he/she is assigned, is the direct representative of the President of the United States. That being the case, the current situation is not surprising. The President fully turned the diplomatic and military authority over to his Secretary of Defense very early into the war. After all, the very first civilian present in Iraq as the US authority, Paul Bremer, reported directly to the Secretary of Defense and not to the Secretary of State. Consequently, the US Military leadership in Iraq, in their well intentioned efforts, have managed to alienate just about every single aspect of Iraqi society and the institutions that represent the real interest of the Iraq people at large.

The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) for the Baghdad area, and all other provinces in Iraq, is a US Government Capacity Building effort primarily designed around engaging Provencal Governments throughout Iraq in the organizational, institutional and operational development of provincial governance. There is no, other than security, military component to the development of provincial governance capacity building.

The PRT program is led (supposedly) by the US State Department. In the process of engaging the Iraqi Provincial Councils and Governors, in the PRT training and development for their respective provinces, State Department personnel are assigned to areas all around Iraq where they live and work closely with the local governors and their councils. Mentoring in city planning, institutional operations, budgetary matters and relations between Iraqi Provincial and Central government entities was the US State Departments vision and thrust within the PRTs. Putting a civilian face to authority and transition was one of the primary and critical goals. The State Department, assisted by US agencies like USAID, US Justice, Agriculture and others, put the civilian face of transition, authority and expertise into the Iraq mindset. At least that was the intention. Any semblance of "civilian" authority in Iraq, American or Iraqi is a mirage.
As late as April 2007,  no actual Iraqi citizens are part of the PRT teams. The US Army will not allow any Iraqis to live on any US Army bases where the PRTs are located and the State Department has not made any attempt to bring Iraqis into the process to assist PRT development or execution. For instance, the U.S. Justice Department PRT members are lawyers and are tasked with developing "Rule of Law", bringing understanding and assisting the implementation of Rule of Law in the Iraqi courts, but, there are no Iraqi Lawyers working directly or indirectly for the PRTs in this effort.

Apparently, the US Military have defined "Rule of Law" as "Law and Order" and have therefore decided that rule of law comes through proper execution of police operations, and the establishment of Iraqi prisons rather than through the adjudication of existing laws in Iraq through courts and representational procedures and execution of justice. The US Military, in effect, has dictated the parameters of acceptable PRT activity.
The military part of the PRT operations, as originally structured, was security, transportation, FOB housing & support in the provinces outside of Baghdad and some civil action engagement relative to engineering and pacification through construction and some public works programs.

In the spirit of unity of purpose and cooperation, between DoD and DoS, each PRT was assigned a US State Department Diplomat to lead the PRT in each province and a US military Deputy (usually Army Colonel) to augment and ensure military operational concurrence with the execution of the PRT planning, operational and training schedules. As it actually turned out, and as it works today the military dictates just about all aspects of what is acceptable in any of the existing PRTs in Iraq. Why? The Golden rule, "He who has the gold, makes the rules".

The DoS, in its effort to conduct the PRTs throughout Iraq has been totally dependent on DOD funding. Until very recently, the Secretary of Defense, through his Commanders, had to sign off on every aspect of PRT funding. The US Ambassador failed to articulate the objectives of the PRTs, Congress failed to understand the objectives of the PRTs, Condoleezza Rice failed to put her authority and DoS funding behind the effort and Donald Rumsfeld was opposed to the PRTs from the onset. Do the math.

Today the PRT program in Iraq is a shell of what was intended, is poorly funded, is for the most part, utilized as a tool to achieve DoD objectives and, since late 2006, is run by a retired Army General on a temporary Diplomatic appointment (commonly referred to as a DoS 3161) who is primarily staffed by active duty army personnel and augmented by other DoS 3161s who rarely engage the Iraqis directly without US Army concurrence.

The full potential and dynamics that could have been manifested throughout Iraq as a result of the PRT, as it was initially intended to operate, will never be known or appreciated. We will never know how many Iraqis, or coalition members would not have died or been injured because a province had a well running PRT fully engaged with the Iraqi provincial government. The level of effective relations, Rule of Law, operational courts and governing capacity among the Iraqi officials may now never be realized.

A weak Department of State and an overzealous, well funded US Military leadership and the US Secretary of Defense have seen to that.
On January 10, 2007, President Bush told the American citizens that he has decided to expand the US role in Iraq and increase the number of US troops on the ground there by about 20,000. He also announced that he will double the scope and size of the PRTs in Iraq. A great preacher, Robert Shuller, once wrote "If you fail to plan, you are planning to fail". Any increase in troop strength or even doubling the size of the PRTs, without a plan to empower the DoS diplomats, adjust or restructure their current operating plan, or to modify engagement rules for our soldiers and include Iraqi participation into the operations, is an act of futility cloaked in what appears to be desperation.

It is difficult to assess the potential, form this point, of a strong, proactive, well lead diplomatic effort in Iraq. The dynamics in this ravaged, oil rich nation have radically changed and the opportunity to educate, pacify or integrate the Iraqi population into any peaceful, forward thinking, organized and law abiding society may have passed.

The divisions between the various Iraq factions have grown and the Iraqi hope for any semblance of order, justice and peace in Iraq has faded from that day in 2003 when the US Military marched into Baghdad after falling a hated dictator.

The feeling of freedom and security are long gone in the Iraqi consciousness, hardly a memory. The hope for a free and democratic country still alive in the hearts of many Iraqis, but the reality of the horror and violence which has become everyday life in Iraq has overcome the strength of spirit which is needed to make a dream come true.

Our President, through his policies and unmerited faith in his Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State and military leadership in Iraq has brought us all, Iraqis and Americans, to a place where we need inspiration, direction and real leadership, all of which are seemingly not forthcoming. In the meantime, the PRT effort remains ineffective due to military control and weak ineffective Diplomatic leadership, authority and vision.

Americans and Iraqis continue to die everyday as a direct result of the vanity, insecurity, inability to lead and the failed leadership of our President, his former Secretary of Defense, Secretary Rice and the notion that might makes right. The PRTs was a noble idea, badly implemented, poorly funded and directed by weak State Department leadership who never did have the power over diplomacy in Iraq.

God help the poor Iraqi civilians and the brave American soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines who have, and continue to suffer as a result of the failed American leadership and vision in Iraq.


About the Author
Marshall Adame retired form the US Marine Corps in 1991. He was the Coalition Airport Directer of Basrahe International Airport, Iraq in 2003.
Marshall was also a US Department of State official in the US Embassy in Baghdad and worked on the PRT program throughout Iraq.

Marshall is a 2008 Democratic candidate for Congress in North Carolina.

http://MarshallAdame...


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