I have not been getting heavily involved in the discussion of Iraq military strategy, etc. I am using this diary to report as neutrally as I can on some observations made after a recent five day trip by someone who is essentially a professional administrator.
Lawrence Korb recently spent five days in Iraq, and from it I have gleaned these interesting observations. Korb was Reagan's Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, Installations and Logistics) from 1981 to 1985. He is the Director of National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign. For more biographical information, see http://en.wikipedia....
The entire diary for his trip is at
http://www.americanp...
Korb was supposed to reside in the Green Zone at the Al Rashid Hotel but it was such a dump he moved to a compound in the Al Mansour neighborhood outside the Green Zone. He was on his trip at the request of the National Academy of Public Administration to examine how Iraq's civilian administration was working.
The number of Iraqis working for the government has jumped from 1.3 million in 2003 to about 2 million today (not including the security forces).
An Iraqi official who is close to Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki told him that in their video conferences, Maliki and Bush do not really communicate. "The official also noted that in his discussions with visiting members of Congress there is really not much dialogue, with both sides giving canned presentations."
The same official said "the insurgency got started when the Americans failed to take control after the overthrow and the Iraqis realized that the American military was not invincible-that is, its soldiers were human beings who displayed the full range of emotions, including fear. Fourth, do not believe anyone who tells you that the situation is getting better."
Korb said there is no doubt that corruption is rampant. The Minister of Planning refers to it the second insurgency.
April 9 was the 4th anniversary of the fall of Saddam. Korb said that to avoid any problems, the government imposed a 24-hour curfew. "During the three-mile drive from our compound to the Green Zone and back, I noticed that there were only a handful of cars and trucks on the road and a small number people out of their homes. It is hard to believe that four years after our "victory," the only way to provide safety is to lock down the capital city."
Ambassador Saloom was upbeat to him about Iraq's progress, citing such positive indicators as the number of satellite dishes and the amount of goods in the stores. Korb said "But the dishes have been there since 2003 (in fact, in my meeting with Bremer in November 2003 he said the same thing), and while the shops may be full, it does not appear that many people are out shopping."
Korb also said that the ambassador did make a good point about the fact that as a result of all the inspections and audits an error-avoidance mentality has permeated the Iraqi bureaucracy and this has had a chilling effect on its ability to take action. "There is no doubt that this is one reason none of the Iraqi ministries have yet to spend even 25 percent of their investment budget."
He had to travel 10 miles to the east side of the Tigris for a meeting: "The other thing that struck me was the lack of American soldiers patrolling the neighborhoods. In fact, in my whole time here I did not see one American soldier outside the Green Zone."
His major conclusions:
"The real issue is if the latest surge will work. The most optimistic projection was "maybe temporarily." But most people speaking off the record believe that the insurgents will shift to other areas and lay low for a while in Baghdad."I knew that the Iraqi government was not very effective, but I had no idea it was so bad. The national government already has 34 cabinet-level ministries and is creating about five more*** The remaining two million civil servants are underpaid, have little motivation, and are hamstrung by a set of rules and regulations that combines the worst elements of Soviet and American bureaucracies.