Stratfor: U.S. Military "Flat-out incapable of imposing security on Iraq"

By: Lowell
Published On: 4/10/2007 12:39:46 PM

I think this is a very interesting analysis by "global intelligence" firm Stratfor on Iran, Iraq, and the U.S. position in the region.  Bolding added by me for emphasis.

The second quarter of 2007 will brim with fury and froth as two states attempt to challenge the geopolitical order imposed by others to stem their expansion, in hopes of regaining their long-lost position as major powers. Throughout the quarter, these two states will seek a louder voice and a stronger hand. The real conflicts, however, will come later.

For the first country -- Iran -- the more aggressive tone is part and parcel of the diplomatic dance with the United States. Both countries realize that their ideal for Iraq -- unified and pro-American for Washington, unified and pro-Iranian for Tehran -- has slipped from the realm of possibility. The two will now negotiate furiously to keep their respective worst-case scenarios -- for the United States, a shattered Iraq in which Iran controls the south; for Iran, a Sunni-run and American-armed Baghdad -- from becoming reality.


In these negotiations, neither side has a particularly strong hand. The Bush administration suffers from a lack of mandate and an overstretched military that is flat-out incapable of imposing security on Iraq. Iranian goals are utterly dependent upon the Iraqi Shia -- who, were they able to unify for any purpose, would have at least at some point in Iraq's history been in charge of their own region (they have never been). Tehran and Washington both can wreck Iraq to ruin each other's plans, but neither wants to live with the consequences. Both can work toward a compromise but are afraid of the domestic backlash of being seen publicly talking to one another. And of course there is that niggling detail that their national interests on this issue really are very close to incompatible.

The result is that each side is trapped at the negotiating table, threatening the other and hoping that something will change on the ground to give them a decisive advantage. Of course, when something appears to be that key event, the other feels obliged to change the equation. Thus the United States seizes an Iranian Consulate in Iraqi Kurdistan, or Iran detains 15 British marines and sailors. Such events will proliferate throughout the quarter as the two powers position and reposition for best effect versus each other. Expect other powers to attempt to leverage Washington's preoccupations to their own advantage -- with the Russians, by dint of influence in Iran and opportunities in Ukraine, likely to achieve the most.

This struggle will not resolve itself in the coming quarter. However, it not only will dominate the news, but also regularly will put Washington and Tehran on an equal footing in the public mind. This will not be a permanent feature (indeed, it is not even remotely accurate once one looks past the headlines) but it undeniably entrenches Iran's return as a major regional power that must be reckoned with.

Key points, in my opinion:

1. Iran is back as a major regional power, thanks in large part to our invasion of Iraq and the removal of that counterweight on the geopolitical chess board.

2. A U.S.-Iran conflict is not imminent, but very well could come down the road.

3. The ideal outcome in Iraq is a lost cause for both the United States and Iraq.  Now, it's a matter of preventing the "worst case" scenario from unfolding.

4. The "overstretched" U.S. military is "flat-out incapable of imposing security on Iraq." 

Thoughts on all this?  I bet Jim Webb would say this was all highly predictable, and in fact that he DID predict it. 


Comments



Desert Crossing - 1999 (norman swingvoter - 4/10/2007 3:32:22 PM)
I totally agree.  Unfortunately they didn't ask Jim Webb to help plan the war.  One irritating failure is that a lot of what has gone wrong was also studied in 1999. In 1999 a series of war games were held that assumed a 400,000 man invasion army.  The study arrived at both best case and worst case conclusions. We know which set have come about.

--In "April 1999, the United States Central Command (CENTCOM), led by Marine General Anthony Zinni (ret.), conducted a series of war games known as Desert Crossing in order to assess potential outcomes of an invasion of Iraq aimed at unseating Saddam Hussein."

--The report forewarned that regime change may cause regional instability by opening the doors to "rival forces bidding for power" which, in turn, could cause societal "fragmentation along religious and/or ethnic lines" and antagonize "aggressive neighbors."

http://www.gwu.edu/~...