US Military Controls Diplomacy In Iraq As US State Department Stands On The Sidelines

By: marshall adame
Published On: 3/31/2007 3:09:01 PM

January 11, 2007
Go to just about any significant meeting between Iraqi Government and US government officials in Iraq and you will quickly understand who is running the Diplomatic efforts in Iraq. The US Military.
Ask any Iraqi government official in Baghdad, or in any of the 18 provinces, who they are primarily counseling and meeting with regarding civil development and governance capacity building and they will, in almost all cases, reply "the US Army".
US Diplomats have, in effect, relinquished their Diplomatic "front seat" in Iraq to the US Military who, although well intentioned, come to the table with little or no idea of what is "diplomatically" required of those engaged in efforts geared to joint solutions, resolutions, plans and cooperative efforts which benefit all parties in substantive and acceptable operational environments.
Diplomacy, in dealing with the Iraqis, is far removed from the Army mindset, as it should be. In the mind of an Army officer, the needs of the Army are paramount to any objective or requirement. Other, non-Army, priorities, requirements, objectives or desires come a very distant second in any action or negotiation. Diplomacy is not the forte of the US Military. Fighting wars is.

Diplomacy is far removed from the dynamics and tactics of fighting a ground war. There is however a requirement for the execution of Diplomatic efforts and programs and administration in a War. That is why we have the US Department of State.
With the US Military in Iraq, diplomacy ends at the exact spot where the Army interest begins. In Iraq this is evident in every single case where the Army is in the lead in dealing with the Iraqis and the Iraqi government. If the US Military "diplomatic" interaction with Iraqi government entities were limited or conducted sparingly, this would not be a major problem, but in Iraq the US Military dominates every single diplomatic and governmental interaction between the two countries and their interest.

The US Ambassador in Iraq, has effectively relinquished his duties and responsibilities to the US Department of Defense. The consequences of which are very evident in Iraq today. As for his part, the US Ambassador, apparently for lack of authority from the President, funding from the DoS, or agreement from the Secretary of Defense, has little to no decision making authority relative to any major US initiatives in Iraq, militarily or Diplomatic. He does make all of the press and photo opportunities. He is also very engaging and an interesting speaker, but his leadership and authority in Iraq has been hardly seen and little heard.

A US Ambassador, in the country where he/she is assigned, is the direct representative of the President of the United States. That being the case, the current situation is not surprising. The President fully turned the diplomatic and military authority over to his Secretary of Defense very early into the war. After all, the very first civilian present in Iraq as the US authority, Paul Bremer, reported directly to the Secretary of Defense and not to the Secretary of State. Consequently, the US Military leadership in Iraq, in their well intentioned efforts, have managed to alienate just about every single aspect of Iraqi society and the institutions that represent the real interest of the Iraq people at large.

The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) for the Baghdad area, and all other provinces in Iraq, is a US Government Capacity Building effort primarily designed around engaging Provencal Governments throughout Iraq in the organizational, institutional and operational development of provincial governance. There is no military component to the development of provincial governance capacity building.

The PRT program is led (supposedly) by the US State Department. In the process of engaging the Iraqi Provincial Councils and Governors, in the PRT training and development for their respective provinces, State Department personnel are assigned to areas all around Iraq where they live and work closely with the local governors and their councils. Mentoring in city planning, institutional operations, budgetary matters and relations between Iraqi Provincial and Central government entities was the US State Departments vision and thrust within the PRTs. Putting a civilian face to authority and transition was one of the primary and critical goals. The State Department, assisted by US agencies like USAID, US Justice, Agriculture and others, put the civilian face of transition, authority and expertise into the Iraq mindset. At least that was the intention.

No actual Iraqis are part of the PRT teams because the US Army will not allow any Iraqis to live on any US Army base where the PRTs are located. Although, for instance, the Justice Department PRT members are lawyers and are tasked with developing "Rule of Law", bringing understanding and assisting the implementation of Rule of Law in the Iraqi courts, no Iraqi Lawyers work directly or indirectly for the PRTs in this effort. Apparently, the US Military have defined "Rule of Law" as "Law and Order" and have therefore decided that rule of law comes through proper execution of police operations, and the establishment of Iraqi prisons rather than through the adjudication of existing laws in Iraq through courts and representational procedures and execution of justice. The US Military, in effect, has dictated the parameters of acceptable PRT activity.

The military part of the PRT operations, as originally structured, was security, transportation, FOB housing & support in the provinces outside of Baghdad and some civil action engagement relative to engineering and pacification through construction and some public works programs. In the spirit of unity of purpose and cooperation between DoD and DoS each PRT was assigned a US State Department Diplomat to lead the PRT in each province and a US military Deputy (usually Army Colonel) to augment and ensure military operational concurrence with the execution of the PRT planning, operational and training schedules. As it actually turned out, and as it works today the military dictates just about all aspects of what is acceptable in any of the existing PRTs in Iraq. Why? The Golden rule, "He who has the gold, makes the rules".

The DoS, in its effort to conduct the PRTs throughout Iraq has been totally dependent on DOD funding. Until very recently, the Secretary of Defense, through his Commanders, had to sign off on every aspect of PRT funding. The US Ambassador failed to articulate the objectives of the PRTs, Congress failed to understand the objectives of the PRTs, Condalisa Rice failed to put her authority and DoS funding behind the effort and Donald Rumsfield was opposed to the PRTs from the onset. Do the math.

Today the PRT program in Iraq is a shell of what was intended, is poorly funded, is for the most part, utilized as a tool to achieve DoD objectives and is run by a retired Army General on a temporary Diplomatic appointment (commonly referred to as a DoS 3161) who is primarily staffed by active duty army personnel and augmented by other DoS 3161s who rarely engage the Iraqis directly without US Army concurrence. The full potential and dynamics that could have been manifested throughout Iraq as a result of the PRT, as it was initially intended to operate, will never be known or appreciated. We will never know how many Iraqis, or coalition members would not have died or been injured because a province had a well running PRT fully engaged with the Iraqi provincial government.

The level of effective relations, Rule of Law, operational courts and governing capacity among the Iraqi officials may now never be realized. A weak Department of State and an overzealous, well funded US Military leadership and the US Secretary of Defense have seen to that.

On January 10, 2007, President Bush told the American citizens that he has decided to expand the US role in Iraq and increase the number of US troops on the ground there by about 20,000. He also announced that he will double the scope and size of the PRTs in Iraq.

A great preacher, Robert Shuller, once wrote "If you fail to plan, you are planning to fail". Any increase in troop strength or even doubling the size of the PRTs, without a plan to empower the DoS diplomats, adjust or restructure their current operating plan, or to modify engagement rules for our soldiers and include Iraqi participation into the operations, is an act of futility cloaked in what appears to be desperation.

It is difficult to assess the potential, form this point, of a strong, proactive, well lead diplomatic effort in Iraq. The dynamics in this ravaged, oil rich nation have radically changed and the opportunity to educate, pacify or integrate the Iraqi population into any peaceful, forward thinking, organized and law abiding society may have passed.

The divisions between the various Iraq factions have grown and the Iraqi hope for any semblance of order, justice and peace in Iraq has faded from that day in 2003 when the US Military marched into Baghdad after falling a hated dictator.

The feeling of freedom and security are long gone in the Iraqi consciousness, hardly a memory. The hope for a free and democratic country still alive in the hearts of many Iraqis, but the reality of the horror and violence which has become everyday life in Iraq has overcome the strength of spirit which is needed to make a dream come true.

Our President, through his policies and unmerited faith in his Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State and military leadership in Iraq has brought us all, Iraqis and Americans, to a place where we need inspiration, direction and real leadership, all of which are seemingly not forthcoming.

About the Author
Marshall is a retired US Marine Vietnam veteran who became an aviation management/logistics consultant in 1992.

He worked in the Kuwait recovery of 1992-93 and was the senior aviation logistics manager for Kaman Aerospace in their Egypt US Government Aviation assistance programs from 1998 through 2002.

Marshall arrived in Iraq in 2003 where he was the Coalition Provincial Authority (CPA) Airport Director for Basrah International Airport, and later VP for Aviation development with an International commercial company in Baghdad.

In 2005, as an appointed US State Department Diplomat in the US Embassy in Baghdad, Marshall was a US Advisor for logistics to the Iraqi Ministry of Interior and was later assigned to the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) where he served on staff of the National Coordination Team (NCT) in Baghdad, Iraq. (Logistics, City planning, Governance Capacity Building, Government Liaison).

Marshall is currently a Sr. Analyst for a DoD contractor.

Marshall, 54, and his wife Becky (Formerly Becky Ortiz), a 3rd grade teacher, have been married for 37 years and have four children, Paul, Veronica, William and Benjamin, and eleven grandchildren.

Two of their sons, William and Benjamin, have served in Iraq in the US Army. William was wounded in action on July 2nd 2006.

Home: Jacksonville NC. Marshall and Becky reside in Jacksonville North Carolina. marshall_adame@yahoo.com

Note: Marshall Adame is a 2008 Democratic candidate for Congress in NC and is a supporter of John Edwards for President


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